Tax and Substantive Aspects of Gifts to Minors by Newman, Lawrence
Cornell Law Review
Volume 50
Issue 3 Spring 1965 Article 4
Tax and Substantive Aspects of Gifts to Minors
Lawrence Newman
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lawrence Newman, Tax and Substantive Aspects of Gifts to Minors, 50 Cornell L. Rev. 446 (1965)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol50/iss3/4
TAX AND SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF
GIFTS TO MINORS*
Lawrence Newmant
INTRODUCTION
Significant advantages are available to donors who contemplate mak-
ing gifts to minors.' From an income tax standpoint, the child, or a trust
for his benefit, is an additional taxpayer with a separate exemption and,
generally, is in a lower tax bracket than the donor.2 Gifts to a minor
may also remove the property from the donor's taxable estate for estate
tax purposes.3 Moreover, the gift tax cost will usually be minimal be-
cause of the 3,000 dollar annual exclusion, the 30,000 dollar lifetime ex-
emption, and the gift splitting privileges available to married taxpayers.'
The gift also has the advantage of retaining the family assets within
the family unit.
I
OUTRIGHT GIFT
The donor, aware of these substantial benefits, may decide to make an
outright gift of securities, cash, or life insurance. An additional taxpayer
will be recognized for income tax purposes, the property will be removed
from the donor's estate for estate tax purposes and, since the direct
transfer is considered to be a gift of a present interest, it will qualify
for the annual gift tax exclusion.5 Thus, the outright gift offers income,
estate, and gift tax advantages and, in addition, apparent simplicity.
The disadvantages of this form of gift are, however, substantial. Be-
* This article is based on an address delivered by the author before the East Coast
Estate Planning Council in November 1964.
t LL.B. 1955, Yale Law School; S.J.D. 1963, New York Law School; Adjunct Professor
of Law, New York Law School; Associate, Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, New
York City; Member of the New York Bar.
1 Caplin, "Trusts for Minors," 13 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 145 (1956); Ehrlich, "The Effec-
tive Use of Support Trusts: Trusts for Minors, Custodian Statutes, Gifts of Future Inter-
ests," N.Y.U. 19th Inst. on Fed. Tax 729 (1961); Miller, "Appropriate Forms of Gifts
to Minors," N.Y.U. 16th Inst. on Fed. Tax 765 (1958); Newman, "The Uniform Gifts to
Minors Act in New York and Other Jurisdictions-Tax Consequences, Possible Abuses, and
Recommendations," 49 Cornell L.Q. 12 (1963); Savage, "Comparative Advantages and Dis-
advantages of Support Trusts and Uniform Gifts to Minors Statute Gifts; What Constitutes
Support for Tax Purposes," N.Y.U. 17th Inst. on Fed. Tax 1097 (1959); Tenney, "Using
the Custodian Statute as a Planning Device," N.Y.U. 16th Inst. on Fed. Tax 937 (1958).
2 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 151(b), 642(b). A trust which is required to distribute
all of its income currently is allowed a deduction of $300. A trust which permits income to
be accumulated is allowed a deduction of $100.
3 This discussion does not attempt to consider those general estate tax principles applicable
to transfers to adults as well as to minors. Thus, the general assumptions of this article
are that the grantor has not made a transfer in contemplation of death, a transfer with a
retained life interest, a transfer taking effect at death, or a revocable transfer. See Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, §§ 2035-38.
4 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 2503, 2521, 2513.
5 Rev. Rul. 54-400, 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 319; Rev. Ru1. 55-408, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 113.
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cause of the legal incapacity of minors, the transferred securities can-
not be sold and the dividends cannot be reinvested without difficulty.
Since minors can disaffirm property transactions, third parties deal at
their peril with the property of a minor.' The immaturity of the minor
may result in his dissipating the property. Finally, if the minor dies be-
fore the age of twenty-one, the usual result is an intestacy in which at
least some portion of the property may return to the parent, thereby
eliminating the income and estate tax advantages of the gift.
Some of these problems can be solved by the appointment of a legal
guardian for the minor. This provides great protection for the minor and
his property since a bond may be required, the minor's property will be
used only with the permission of the court, and periodic accountings will
normally be filed. Third parties will not hesitate to deal with the property
because the guardian will have the legal capacity to act for the minor.
Unfortunately, the appointment of a legal guardian is not without
serious disadvantages. The legal guardianship is expensive and cumber-
some.7 Additionally, if the minor dies before the age of twenty-one, the
intestacy possibility once again arises.
Outright gifts to minors would thus appear to involve serious problems
to which the appointment of a guardian does not supply a satisfactory
solution.
II
OTHER Foims
Four other forms of gifts to minors effect a more sound combination
of the available tax and practical advantages.
The "short term" trust8 is one in which income is paid to the minor or
is accumulated for his benefit for a period of at least ten years, at the
end of which the trust terminates and the corpus reverts to the grantor.
The section 2503(c) trust9 permits the trustee to use the income and
corpus "for the benefit of" the child during his minority. All the remain-
ing income and principal must be distributed to the minor when he reaches
his majority or, if he dies before attaining the age of twenty-one, the prop-
erty must be paid to his estate or as he may appoint under a general
power of appointment.
0 Day, "Stock Transfers Under Custodian Statutes," 31 Conn. BJ. 40 (1957); Shattuck,
"Gifts to Minors, Legal and Tax Considerations in Arranging Transfers," 90 Trusts & Estates
659 (1951); Note, 6 Notre Dame Law. 101 (1930); Legislation, 31 St. John's L. Rev. 155
(1956); Recent Legislation, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 883 (1956). Statutes in particular situations
permit adults to deal with minors. N.Y. Banking Law § 134(1) (bank deposits); N.Y. Ins.
Law § 245.
7 Browning, "Gifts to Minors," 27 Conn. B.J. 407, 413 (1953); Rogers, "Some Practical
Considerations in Gifts to Minors," 20 Fordham L. Rev. 233, 241-42 (1951).
8 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 673(a).
9 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2503(c).
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The Uniform Gifts to Minors Acts' ° provide a simple procedure by
which an adult can make a gift of securities or cash to a minor, while re-
serving the managerial powers in a custodian. The custodian's function
is to collect and manage the custodial property and pay over to the
minor, or use for his benefit, as much of the property as the custodian
deems advisable for the support, maintenance, education, and benefit of
the minor. To the extent that the custodial property is not expended for
the minor, the custodian must turn it over to the minor on the minor's
attaining the age of twenty-one years or, if the minor dies before achiev-
ing his majority, to the estate of the minor.
The section 2503(b) trust" allows the income to be paid out to the
child during his entire lifetime. The grantor may dispose of the re-
mainder to designated persons other than the minor.
Income Tax
Certain general income tax considerations are operative in considering
these four types of gifts to minors.
The grantor of a trust is taxable on trust income that may be applied
to discharge any of his legal obligations.'" Where the income may be
used to discharge the grantor's legal obligation of support, however, only
income actually so applied or distributed is taxable to the grantor.'3
A nongrantor trustee who applies trust income to discharge his legal
obligation of support is similarly taxed on the income only to the extent
that it is actually so applied.'4
The regulations extend the potential income tax liability even further
by providing that "any amount which, pursuant to the terms of a will or
trust instrument, is used in full or partial discharge or satisfaction of a
legal obligation of any person is included in the gross income of such
person .... "15
The two major potential pitfalls in the income tax area involve pay-
ments satisfying a support obligation or a contractual obligation.
In the support situation, tax liability, to the extent of income actually
used to satisfy the obligation rather than to income which is available
for this purpose, may be imposed on the grantor of the trust, on a
nongrantor trustee, and even on a nongrantor who is not a trustee.
Whether a particular payment discharges an individual's support obliga-
tion often is a difficult problem to resolve. The regulations state that local
10 See, e.g., N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 265-71.
11 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2503(b).
12 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 677(a).
I3 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 677(b).
14 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 678(c).
15 Treas. Reg. § 1.662(a)-4 (1956).
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law determines the extent of a parent's obligation to support a child:
"the term 'legal obligation' includes a legal obligation to support
another person if, and only if, the obligation is not affected by the ade-
quacy of the dependent's own resources" and "to the extent that the
parent's legal obligation of support, including education, is determined
under local law by the family's station in life and by the means of the
parent, it is to be determined without consideration of the trust income
in question. 16
The most topical problem in this area is whether payments from trust
income for education expenses of a minor constitute the discharge of a
parent's obligation to support his child thus making the income taxable
to the parent." In New York, this depends on a consideration of the
assets, social position, and situation in life of the infant and his parents.
In International Text Book Co. v. Connelly,'8 an infant, representing
that he was twenty-one years of age, entered into a contract pursuant
to which he agreed to pay a specified sum to plaintiff as tuition for
plaintiff's engineering course. The court overruled the contention that
the education expense was a "necessary" and held the infancy to be a
defense, stating that the meaning of:
The word "necessaries".. . depends on the social position and situation in
life of the infant as well as upon his own fortune and that of his parents.
What would be necessary in a legal sense for an infant with ample means
of his own might not be so for one with no means at all....
A proper education is a necessary, but what is a proper education depends
on circumstances. A common school education is doubtless necessary in this
country, because it is essential to the transaction of business and the ade-
quate discharge of civil and political duties. A classical or professional educa-
tion, however, has been held not to come within the term.... Still, circum-
stances ... may exist where even such an education might properly be found
a necessary as a matter of fact.19
Various statutes treat education as an element of support.2 0 There is
nothing in the cases that would prevent expenses for a college education,
for example, from being considered as support in a proper situation.2'
In fact, the very existence of a trust created by a parent to provide for
16 Ibid.
17 Rothe, "Taxability of Parents on the Use of Trust Income by or for Their Children
(pt. 1)," 48 Ill. B.J. 294 (1959) ; Samuels, "Beware of Trusts for Dependents 1" 37 Taxes 1009
(1959) ; Tomlinson, "Support Trusts and Gifts to Minors," 97 Trusts & Estates 929 (1958).
18 206 N.Y. 188, 99 N.E. 722 (1912).
19 Id. at 195, 99 N.E. at 725.
20 See, e.g., N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 17; N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 62; N.Y. Family Ct. Act
§ 416.
21 See also Matthews v. Matthews, 14 App. Div. 2d 546, 217 N.Y.S.2d 736 (2d Dep't
1961) ("whether a college education is a necessary ... in the light of respondent's pecu-
niary ability, and whether her present support allowance is sufficient to sustain the cost of
such education, constitute questions of fact for the Children's Court to resolve in the first
instance"); Samson v. Schoen, 204 Misc. 603, 121 N.Y.S.2d 489 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Queens
County 1953) (father's duty of support held not to include the expenses of a college educa-
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the education of his child might be a factor indicating that the family's
station in life justified the conclusion that the payment of college edu-
cation expenses was within the parent's obligation of support.
Several solutions to the support problem have been suggested. One of
these is to accumulate trust income during minority; this would prevent
the income from being taxed to the person obligated to support the
minor 2 If the trust provided that income could only be used for luxury
items, the income would be removed from the area of support. If income
were distributed currently to the minor and invested for his benefit, it
would seem that the income was not being used for the minor's support.
Legislative provisions declaring that parents have no duty to provide
a college education where a minor has independent means or where
trust corpus or income is available for his education would also seem to
refute the argument that trust income used for education constitutes a
discharge of the parent's support obligation.2"
tion); Borden v. Borden, 130 N.Y.S.2d 831 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County 1954) (private
school tuition held not to be an element of the statutory duty of support) ; Raymond M.
McKay, 34 T.C. 1080 (1960).
22 Ehrlich, supra note 1; Lauritzen, "Super Support Trusts-Or How To Set up a Trust
To Pay Income to Minor Children Without Taxing the Income to the Settlor," 1 Tax
Counselor's Q., June 1957, p. 1; Miller, supra note 1.
23 See, e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 33-15-1 (Supp. 1964):
Parents as joint natural guardians-The father and mother shall be the joint natural
guardians of their minor children and shall be equally charged with their care, nurture,
welfare and education; and they may be sued either jointly or separately for the sup-
port of their minor children. To the extent that any such minor child has property or
an estate of his or her own, or that there is income or principal of any trust for his
or her benefit, which may be used to provide such child with an education in a college,
university or private school, such natural guardians shall not be obligated either jointly
or separately to provide such an education. The foregoing sentence shall not be deemed
to create by implication any obligation to provide such an education where none would
otherwise exist.
See also Ga. Code Ann. § 23-2311 (Supp. 1963):
Reduction of obligation to support person with income from estate or trust-When-
ever income from an estate or trust is available for the benefit of a person whose sup-
port is the legal obligation of another and such income is actually used for such per-
son's support, the legal obligation of the other to support such person is reduced to the
extent that such income is actually used for such person's support.
In most states, the parent is liable for the minor's support in accordance with the parent's
financial ability despite the independent assets of the minor. Ala. Code tit. 21, § 78 (Supp.
1964); Alaska Stat. § 25.20.40 (Supp. 1964); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-851 (1956); Cal.
Prob. Code § 1504; Idaho Code § 15-1811 (Supp. 1963); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 59-1802
(Supp. 1959) ; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 158, § 16 (Supp. 1963) ; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 201,
§ 41 (Supp. 1962); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.3178 (209) (Supp. 1963); Minn. Stat. § 525.56
(Supp. 1964); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 91-4609 (1964); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 38-111 (Supp.
1963); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 159.70 (1963); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 463:12 (Supp. 1963);
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 3A:20-1 (Supp. 1964); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law R. 1211; N.Y. Family Ct.
Act § 416; N.D. Cent. Code § 30-10-19 (Supp. 1963); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 58, § 802 (Supp.
1964); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 126.225 (1961); Utah Code Ann. § 75-13-17 (Supp. 1963); Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. § 11.92.040 (Supp. 1964); Wis. Stat. § 319.21 (1963).
See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 152-9-13 (Supp. 1961) ; Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, §§ 701-02, tit.
12, § 3923(a) (Supp. 1962); D.C. Code Ann. § 21-126 (Supp. IV, 1965); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 744.64(2) (Supp. 1964) ; Hawaii Rev. Laws §§ 330-5, 338-25 (1955) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 3,§§ 132, 139-140 (Supp. Smith-Hurd 1964); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 8-133 (Supp. 1964); Iowa
Code §§ 252A.3(1)-(2) (Supp. 1964); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 405.020(1) (1962); Md. Ann.
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In the contractual obligation context, the grantor's tax liability is not
limited to payments actually made, but extends to all income that may
be used to discharge his legal obligations. In Morrill v. United States24
the taxpayer established four ten year trusts to pay the costs of tuition,
room, books, and travel for his four children while they were attending
colleges and private schools. As each trust terminated, its corpus was to
revert to the taxpayer. At two of the schools the taxpayer had signed a
contract under which he agreed to be responsible for the payment of the
bills. The court held that the amount paid from the trusts was includible
in the taxpayer's income since it was used to satisfy a legal obligation of
the taxpayer. The grantor in this case was taxed both on the two express
contracts and on the implied obligations to pay the children's bills at the
other schools. It is not unusual for parents to sign a contract with a
school pursuant to which they agree to be responsible for the payment
of their child's tuition fee. The danger is that the government may argue
that payment of trust income, where required by contract, constitutes the
discharge of a contractual obligation rather than payment for "support."
If this argument succeeded, the grantor could be taxed on the entire
trust income whether or not it was actually used for tuition.25
Code art. 93, § 198 (1964), art. 72a, § 1 (1957) ; Miss. Code Ann. § 413 (Supp. 1962);
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 475.025, 475.030, 475.125 (Supp. 1964); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 33-5 to -6
(Supp. 1963); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2111.13 (Supp. Page 1964); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20,
§ 32.1084 (Supp. 1964); S.D. Code 88 14.0310, 14.0314 (Supp. 1960); Tenn. Code Ann.
§§ 34-101, -401 (Supp. 1964); Tex. Prob. Code § 109, 236(a) (Supp. 1964); Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 33, § 931, tit. 14, §§ 2641, 2646, 2754 (1959), tit. 14, § 2652 (Supp. 1963);
Va. Code Ann. §§ 31-1, -8 (Supp. 1964); W. Va. Code Ann. § 4251 (Supp. 1964);
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-6 (Supp. 1963).
The State of Louisiana, influenced by the Roman law doctrine of usufruct as developed
by the Napoleonic Code, provides as follows in La. Civ. Code arts. 223-224 (Slovenko
1961):
Fathers and mothers shall have, during marriage, the enjoyment of the estate of
their children until their majority or emancipation ....
The obligations resulting from this enjoyment shall be:
2. To support, maintain and to educate their children according to their situation
in life.
In the case of Succession of Fontano, 196 La. 775, 792-3, 200 So. 142, 148 (1941), the
court stated:
When children have property from which a sufficient income may be derived to
provide for their subsistence and education, the natural obligation of their father ceases,
after the dissolution of the marriage; and . . . then their expenses should be provided
for out of the revenues of their property, pro tanto, at least if insufficient.
24 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas. if 9463 (D. Me.).
25 The District Court's opinion in the Morrill case contained the following footnote:
The Commissioner initially based his assessment on Section 677(b). The Government
later shifted its ground for asserting taxability to Section 677(a). During legal argument
before the Court, counsel for the Government and for the taxpayers conceded that
Section 677(b) has no application to the facts of this case. In this they were correct
because Subsection (b) merely limits the tax, imposed by Subsection (a), on trust income
which may be applied for the support or maintenance of a beneficiary whom the
grantor is legally obligated to support or maintain, to that portion of the trust income
which is so applied. Here the Government has not attempted to tax that part of the
trust income which was not used to pay the school and college bills in issue. Congress
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Estate Tax
Certain general estate tax principles arise in considering short term
trusts, section 2503(c) trusts, transfers under the Uniform Gifts to
Minors Acts, and section 2503(b) trusts.
If the grantor is one of the trustees and has a power to direct the use
of the trust income to support his dependents, the trust property is in-
cludible in his estate as a retained right to possession or enjoyment of
income." Similarly, where a grantor who is also a trustee retains the
right to accelerate payments of corpus to the beneficiary, the trust prop-
erty will be included in the grantor's estate if he dies during the term
of the trust without having exercised this power.27
In State St. Trust Co. v. United States,28 the grantor as co-trustee
had the power: (1) to exchange trust property for other property without
regard to the value of the respective properties; (2) to invest in nonlegals
or nonincome producing properties; and (3) to allocate stock dividends
and capital gains to principal or income. The court held that the decedent
as co-trustee had reserved such broad powers that he could shift the
economic benefits between the life tenant and remainderman. The trust
property was therefore includible in his estate since he had a right to
designate those persons who would possess or enjoy income. The State
Street doctrine of retained administrative control appears, however, to
have been restricted to its particular facts by the courts.2 9
Gift Tax
Gifts to a section 2503 (c) trust and transfers under the Uniform Gifts
to Minors Acts qualify for the gift tax annual exclusion. Certain general
gift tax exclusion considerations apply to short term trusts and to section
2503(b) trusts.
The income interest of a trust requiring a mandatory distribution
of income qualifies for the annual exclusion." If the trust provides for a
mandatory distribution of income among several beneficiaries, however,
the interest of the donees is not considered a present interest and
thus does not qualify for the annual exclusionf 1 If the trust directs a
enacted what is now Subsection (b), 58 Stat. 51 (1944), to change the law established
by the holding in Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154 (1942) [that income which may
be used to discharge the grantor's legal obligation of support is taxable to him] ....
Id. at 92,240 n.2.
26 Townsend v. Thompson, 42 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1309 (E.D. Ark. 1950).
27 Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953).
28 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959).
29 See, e.g., Estate of Peters, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 994 (1964); Estate of King, 37 T.C.
973 (1962).
80 Sensenbrenner v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1943); Fisher v. Commis-
sioner, 132 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1942).
31 Rev. Rul. 55-303, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 471.
[Vol. 50
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mandatory distribution of income, but permits discretionary principal
invasion in favor of the income beneficiary, the annual exclusion is avail-
able. 2 With limited exceptions, 8 if the trust provides for a discretionary
accumulation of income, the annual exclusion is not available. 34 A trust
which has a mandatory accumulation provision does not qualify for the
annual exclusion. 5
III
SHoRT TEm TRUST
The "short term trust" may be described for our purposes as one
under which the income is payable or accumulated for the benefit of a
child for at least a ten year period, at the end of which it terminates and
the trust property reverts to the grantor. For income tax purposes a new
taxpayer has been created and the trust income will therefore not be taxed
to the grantor, but will instead be taxed to the trust if accumulated, or
to the income beneficiary if paid to him. There is little estate tax ad-
vantage derived from this type of transfer since the grantor has retained
a substantial reversionary interest. If the grantor dies during the term
of the trust, the corpus of the trust, less the value of the outstanding
income interest, is included in his estate for estate tax purposes. A gift
tax would be payable on the right to income for the ten year period. The
annual exclusion would be available if the trust provided that all income
was currently distributable to the beneficiary, but not if the income
could be accumulated in the discretion of the trustee.
The "short term trust" is most advantageous as an income shifting
device for the grantor in a high income tax bracket whose capital assets
do not warrant a permanent transfer of property. Moreover, successor
trustees may be designated by the grantor and the -trust instrument may
grant the trustees broad investment discretion. On the other hand, the
grantor has only made a temporary transfer of his property and the cost
of retaining this substantial future interest is that the reversionary in-
terest is included in the grantor's estate for estate tax purposes.
32 The exclusion is expressly available under § 2503(b) of the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code. Prior to 1954, the exclusion would have been denied on the ground that the income
interest of the beneficiary was incapable of valuation. See, e.g., Jennie Brody, 19 T.C. 126
(1952); Sylvia H. Evans, 17 T.C. 206 (1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1952).
33 The exclusion has been granted for the income interest of a discretionary accumulation
trust where there is some indication from the trust or surrounding circumstances that a
steady flow of income will occur. See, e.g., Elise McK. Morgan, 42 P-H Tax Ct. Rep. & Mem.
Dec. J 42.85 (Sept. 21, 1964) (discretionary payments of income during the minority of a
retarded minor qualified for annual exclusion).
34 Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442 (1945); Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U.S.
18 (1945).
35 Ryerson v. United States, 312 U.S. 405 (1941); United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399
(1941).
1965]
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A danger for the donor of the short term trust lies in the capital gains
area. Any capital gains realized by the trust will be taxed to the donor
in the year realized even though he does not currently receive the sales
proceeds out of which to pay the capital gains tax." If an attempt is made
to avoid -the capital gains tax liability of the donor by providing that
capital gains are distributable to the income beneficiaries, the entire gift,
rather than only the income interest, may be subjected to a gift tax.
The possibility that principal, in the form of realized capital gains, will
not revert to the grantor might cause the Internal Revenue Service
to take the position that the reversionary interest is incapable of being
valued and that the entire principal constitutes a gift. 7
IV
SECTION 2503(c)
The section 2503(c) trust is a form of transfer which permits the
property and income therefrom to be used for the benefit of the minor.
To the extent that the property is not used for the minor, it must be
distributed to him when he reaches the age of twenty-one. If the minor
dies before this age, the property must be payable to his estate or as he
may appoint under a general power of appointment. The regulations pro-
vide that the power of appointment may be exercisable by the donee by
will or during his lifetime and that the minor's incapacity, under local
law, to exercise such a power is of no tax significance." Thus, under the
section 2503(c) trust, a minor can be given a general testamentary power
of appointment and provision can be made by the grantor for a gift over
in default of the exercise of this power. Section 2503(c) represents the leg-
islative resolution of the confusion39 as to whether gifts in trust for the
36 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 677(a).
37 Rev. Rul. 60-385, 1960-2 Cum. Bull. 77, held that where a trust instrument provides
that the principal of a trust may be invested in stock of regulated investment companies
and that capital gains dividends are to be treated as income and paid to the life tenant,
the charitable remainder interest is incapable of valuation and no deduction is allowed.
A private letter ruling has apparently applied this reasoning to the short term trust rever-
sionary interest situation. See "Shop Talk," 12 J. Taxation 382 (1960).
38 Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-4(b) (1958).
39 In Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1951), and in Stifel v. Com-
missioner, 197 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1952), the trustees were empowered to pay or apply income
to, or for the benefit of, the minor beneficiaries and to accumulate any amounts not so
paid or applied. The beneficiaries, or their guardians, could request that the accumulated
income and corpus be distributed to them. In neither of the cases was a guardian actually
appointed. The court in Kieckhefer decided that the annual gift tax exclusion was available
since present rights had been created in the income and corpus despite the disability of
the minor. The Stifel court reached a contrary result and denied the exclusion on the
ground that, as no guardian had actually been appointed, the minor did not possess a
sufficient present interest to entitle the settlor to the annual exclusion. The Stifel case view
was adopted by the Internal Revenue Service in cases under the 1939 Code. The appointment
of a guardian was the determining factor. Rev. Rul. 54-91, 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 207.
(Vol. 50
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benefit of minors qualify for the annual exclusion. It provides in relevant
part that:
No part of a gift to an individual who has not attained the age of 21
years on the date of such transfer shall be considered a gift of a future
interest in property ... if the property and the income therefrom-
(1) may be expended by, or for the benefit of, the donee before his
attaining the age of 21 years, and
(2) will to the extent not so expended-
(A) pass to the donee on his attaining the age of 21 years, and
(B) in the event the donee dies before attaining the age of 21 years,
be payable to the estate of the donee or as he may appoint under a
general power of appointment ....
The effect of section 2503(c) is that gifts made in compliance with the
statute qualify for the annual gift tax exclusion even though the trustee
has the discretion to accumulate income for the minor and is not re-
quired to pay the income currently to the minor. Further, a new taxpayer
is created for income tax purposes by this form of transfer and the prop-
erty transferred to the trust does not fall into the grantor's estate.
The grantor is afforded the flexibility of being able to designate suc-
cessor trustees and to permit broad investment authority to be exercised
by the trustees. Further, the donor, by providing for a taker in default
of the minor's exercise of a power of appointment, can keep the property
out of the minor's estate if the minor dies before the age of twenty-one.
The fact that local law may not permit the minor to exercise his general
testamentary power of appointment-for example, where he is under the
age required for the valid execution of a will-does not prevent the grantor
from effectively designating a taker in default. The disadvantage of this
form of transfer is that the property must be given outright to the minor
at the age of twenty-one. Where substantial property is involved, a grantor
may prefer that certain restraints on the beneficiary's control remain until
the beneficiary is older than twenty-one.
It should be recognized that the availability of the gift tax exclusion
depends on strict compliance with the statutory provisions. If the
minor dies before the age of twenty-one, the statute requires that the
property pass to his estate or as he appoints under a general power of ap-
pointment. A trust which creates a remainder over to the descendants of
the beneficiary if he dies before the age of twenty-one does not satisfy the
requirements of the statute.40 The statute further demands that the prop-
erty be given outright to the minor when he attains the age of twenty-one.
A trust which provided that it would automatically be extended after the
40 Bonnie M. Heath, 34 T.C. 587 (1960).
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beneficiary reached twenty-one unless he elected to terminate would not
qualify for section 2503(c) treatment.41
An interesting line of recent cases suggests the possibility of qualifying
a portion of the income interest for the annual exclusion even where the
trust corpus is not distributed -to the minor when he reaches twenty-one.
In Jacob Konner' the court held that where the income of a short term
trust was required to be paid to a section 2503(c) trust, the income
interest of the short term trust constituted a present interest for purposes
of the gift tax exclusion. In Arlean I. Herr" the trust was to continue
until the minor beneficiary reached the age of thirty. During minority,
the trustees could distribute income to the beneficiary or accumulate it
for his benefit, but when the beneficiary attained the age of twenty-one,
all accumulated income was required to be paid to him. After the bene-
ficiary attained majority, the trust income was directed to be paid to
him currently. The court, distinguishing the income interest during
minority from the balance of the income interest and from the interest
in principal, held that the gift of the income interest during minority
qualified for the annual exclusion.
Although the Internal Revenue Service has not acquiesced in the
Court's determination of the Herr case, the attractive possibility exists
of qualifying a substantial portion of a trust transfer for the annual ex-
clusion without requiring the entire principal to be paid to the minor
when he reaches twenty-one and without distributing income currently
to the beneficiary during minority.44
The section 2503 (c) trust is a flexible and effective device for transfers
to a minor if the grantor is not averse to having the trust corpus and
accumulated income go outright to the minor when he reaches twenty-one.
The estate planning value of the section 2503 (c) trust may be enhanced
when combined with a Konner case pour-over from a short term trust,
thus qualifying the entire income interest of the short term trust for the
annual exclusion while preserving the grantor's reversionary interest in the
corpus. Herr may permit the variation that the annual exclusion may be
preserved for a large portion of the income interest even if the trust pro-
visions do not require that the entire income interest be distributed to
the minor when he becomes twenty-one.
41 Rev. Rul. 60-218, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 378.
42 35 T.C. 727 (1961).
43 35 T.C. 732 (1961), aff'd, 303 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1962).
44 See, e.g., Josephine N. Thebaut, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 603 (1964) (income interest
qualified for the annual exclusion even though the trustee did not have the power to dis-
tribute corpus during the term of the trust); Rollman v. United States, 342 F.2d 62 (Ct.
Cl. 1965).
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V
UNIFom GnaTs TO MINORS AcTs
Under the Uniform Gifts to Minors Acts, outright gifts of legal title
to securities and money can be vested in a minor while management rests
in the custodian.45 The custodian has the discretion to pay over as much
of the custodial property as he deems advisable for the support, educa-
tion, maintenance, and benefit of the minor.48 To the extent that the
custodial property is not so distributed, it must be paid to -the minor on
his attaining the age of twenty-one or to his estate if he dies before that
time. 7 This form of transfer does not permit the donor to provide for a
remainder over in default of the exercise of- a power of appointment by
the minor.
A gift under the Uniform Gifts to Minors Acts qualifies for the annual
gift tax exclusion. In 1956, the Treasury Department Tax Rulings Divi-
sion stated that, under section 2503(c), a gift of property to a minor
qualified for the annual exclusion if the income and property could be
expended by or for the benefit of the minor prior to his attaining the age
of twenty-one, the balance passing to the minor when he reached twenty-
one, or in the event of his prior death, to his estate or as he might appoint
by deed or will. It was noted that the language of the Uniform Gifts
to Minors Acts was substantially the same as that of section 2503(c) of
the 1954 Code and that under the Gifts to Minors Acts the minor is
vested with full legal title to the securities. The ruling then provided that:
In view of the foregoing, it is held that the transfer by the donor of the
shares of stock of Public Service Company of Colorado ... was completed
for Federal gift tax purposes on the date the shares were registered on the
books of the corporation in the name of the donor as custodian for his minor
daughter. It is also held that the transfer of the shares in question represents
a gift of a present interest in property within the meaning of Section
2503(c) of the 1954 Code.48
For income tax purposes, this form of gift provides an additional
taxpayer. The Internal Revenue Service has analogized the Uniform
Gifts to Minors Acts transfers to transfers in trust, holding that income
derived from property transferred under the custodian statutes which
45 See, e.g., N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 265-71.
46 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 266(2).
47 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 266 (4).
48 Letter from H. T. Swartz, Director, Tax Rulings Division, to Clarence E. Dawson,
c/o Milbank, Tweed, Hope & Hadley, Jan. 6, 1956, a copy of which is on file in the Library
of the Cornell Law School; Rev. Rul. 56-86 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 449; see Bowe, "Tax Moti-
vated Gifts to Minors," 34 Dicta 20, 27 (1957); Bronston, "Some Tax Problems in Making
Gifts to or for Minors," 45 Il. B.J. 320, 322 (1957) ; Forbes, "Gifts to Minors," 19 Mont. L.
Rev. 106, 112 (1958); Tenney, "Tax Considerations in Gifts to Minors Made Under New
State Custodian Laws," 5 J. Taxation 348 (1956); Widmark, "Security Gifts to Minors,"
95 Trusts & Estates 698, 700 (1956).
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is used to discharge, in whole or in part, a legal obligation of any person
to support a minor is, to the extent so used, taxable to the adult.49
The federal estate tax consequences of a gift under the custodian
statutes were determined in 1957. Rev. Rul. 366, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 618
states that when a donor transfers property to himself as trustee and
retains the right to pay the income and the principal to a designated bene-
ficiary or the right to withhold enjoyment until the beneficiary reaches a
certain age, the value of the property is includible in the donor's estate
under section 2038(a) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 because
it constitutes a transfer with a retained power to alter, amend, revoke,
or terminate. The ruling then indicates that the donor who transfers
property to himself as custodian for a minor is in the same position and
concludes that "in view of the foregoing, it is held that the value of
property transferred by a donor to himself as custodian for a minor
donee ... is includible in the donor's gross estate for Federal estate tax
purposes in the event of his death while acting as custodian and before
the donee attains the age of 21 years."5 In those situations where the
donor is not the custodian, the transferred property is not within his
estate.
This form of transfer thus provides income tax, estate tax, and gift
tax exclusion advantages. In addition, it is a simple and convenient method
of transferring property to the minor which does not require a formal
trust agreement or the filing of fiduciary returns.
Transfers under the Uniform Gifts to Minors Acts do, however, present
disadvantages. The property must be given outright to the minor at the
age of twenty-one. Under most Uniform Gifts to Minors Acts, only trans-
fers of money and securities are permitted.5' Where substantial assets are
49 Rev. Rul. 56-484, 1956-2 Cum. Bull. 23. One way in which this conclusion could
be changed would be to amend § 677(b) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code to exclude
specifically the custodian transfer situation. See Gossels, "Gifts to Minors-Income Tax
Consequences of Massachusetts Support Law," 4 Boston B.J., Feb. 1960, pp. 13, 19; Laurit-
zen, "Tax Problems on Gifts of Securities to Minors-Additional Comments," 1 Tax Coun-
selor's Q., Sept. 1957, pp. 123, 126; Lauritzen, "Watch Out for Tax Problems on Gifts of
Securities for Minors," 1 Tax Counselor's Q., March 1957, pp. 131-32; Tomlinson, "Support
Trusts and Gifts to Minors," 97 Trusts & Estates 929, 932 (1958).
5o Rev. Rul. 57-366, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 618, 619. See also Estate of Jack F. Chrysler,
44 P-H Tax Ct. Rep. & Mem. Dec. II 44.4 (April 17, 1965). Many of the states had originally
enacted the Model Act which was applicable only to gifts of securities. The Uniform Act
extended the application bf the custodian statute to gifts of money as well as securities
and is today the statute in effect in all of the states except Alaska. The question raised
was whether the tax rulings which had involved the Model Act statutes covered the Uniform
Acts as well. In 1959, the Internal Revenue Service, in Rev. Rul. 59-357, 1959-2 Cum. Bull.
212, stated that the variations between the Model Act and the Uniform Act did not warrant
any departure from the previous rulings. Legislation has been introduced, thus far unsuc-
cessfully, to remove the custodial property from the donor-custodian's estate if he dies
before the minor reaches the age of, twenty-one.
51 The Alaska statute allows only gifts of securities. Gifts of life insurance are permitted
by the District of Columbia and fourteen states: California, Connecticut, Illinois, Kentucky,
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involved, the donor may prefer an arrangement under which the property
would not be distributed until the minor is older than twenty-one. Suc-
cessor custodian arrangements are cumbersome. For example, at present,
a successor custodian cannot be designated in the original transfer and,
if the custodian dies, court proceedings may be required for the appoint-
ment of a successor.52 The statutes restrict the investment powers of the
custodian by providing that, although the custodian may retain any
securities originally given, he may reinvest only in such securities as
would be purchased by a prudent man of discretion and intelligence who
is seeking a reasonable income and the preservation of his capital.
Finally, if the minor dies before the age of twenty-one, the property will
pass through the minor's estate.
A danger in the custodian statute transfer is that the statute requires
the custodian who expends funds for 'the minor to use these funds for
the support, maintenance, education, and benefit of the beneficiary. Every
expenditure, therefore, runs the risk of being deemed part of the settlor's
taxable income on the ground that it discharges a portion of the grantor's
legal obligation of support.
It would thus seem that the principal value of Uniform Gifts to Minors
Acts transfers is in situations involving small gifts of securities or cash
to minors.
VI
SECTION 2503(b)
The section 2503(b) trust is a form of transfer under which income is
payable currently to a minor. The practical advantages are that the trust
need not terminate when the beneficiary reaches the age of twenty-one,
corpus may be invaded for the benefit of the beneficiary during the trust
term, and the grantor can provide for a gift over on the death of the
beneficiary. Additionally, the section 2503(b) trust affords flexibility in
successor fiduciary arrangements and in the investment powers which
may be granted to the trustees.
For income tax purposes, a new taxpayer has been created. The prop-
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Caro-
lina, Ohio, Tennessee, and Wisconsin.
52 Legislation is now being drafted which would permit the original custodian, without
resigning, to designate a successor custodian. Under the present law, if the person desig-
nated as custodian dies, the legal guardian of the minor becomes successor custodian. If
the minor has no guardian, application must be made to the court for the appointment of a
successor custodian. The proposed legislation would provide that, if the custodian has
not designated a successor custodian, a minor over fourteen years of age could designate
the successor custodian himself. Application to the court for the appointment of a suc-
cessor custodian would then be necessary only in the absence of both a designation by the
original custodian and an effective designation by the minor.
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erty has been removed from the donor's taxable estate. The actuarial
value of the income interest qualifies for the annual gift tax exclusion as
a gift of a present interest.I The section 2503 (b) transfer is most advantageous in connection with
a program of transfers to minors. Thus, a husband and wife could, during
the minority of a child, give approximately $150,000 in gifts tax free and
still each retain $17,000 of their lifetime exemption.5"
The major disadvantage of this arrangement, however, is the danger
of unwise use of the income by the minor.
CONCLUSION
Outright gifts to minors involve many disadvantages which are not
remedied sufficiently by a guardianship arrangement.
The short term trust is a valuable income tax saving device which is
used to maximum advantage by the high income tax bracket grantor
whose estate tax situation does not justify irrevocable transfers.
The section 2503 (c) transfer offers the flexibility of the trust arrange-
ment, but is only suitable where there is no reluctance to having the trust
assets distributed to the beneficiary when he attains the age of twenty-
one.
The custodian statute transfer is most valuable in situations involving
relatively small transfers of securities or cash.
The section 2503(b) trust is of significance as part of a substantial
program of gifts to minors.
While there are both advantages and disadvantages present in the
various forms of transfers to minors, these techniques provide a wide
range of potential estate planning benefits.
53 The exclusion is not available for that portion of the gift which represents the value
of the remainder interest. See Rogers, Forbes & Smith, "Recent Changes in the Rules for
Gifts to Minors (How the Trouble Has Been Cleared up)," 17 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 585 (1956).
